S. HRG. 99-653

NOMINATION OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

MARCH 5 AND APRIL 29, 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61-178 O WASHINGTON : 1986

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

S381-18

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, *Chairman*

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina	CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas	PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota	EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota	ALAN CRANSTON, California
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska	CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
PAUL S. TRIBLE, Jr., Virginia	THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri
DANIEL J. EVANS, Washington	JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

M. Graeme Bannerman, *Staff Director*
Geryld B. Christianson, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

Hearing days: Page

March 5, 1986 1
April 29, 1986 7

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1986

Statement of:
Abramowitz, Morton I., of Massachusetts, nominated to be an Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2
Insertions for the record:
Biographical data of Morton I. Abramowitz 4

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1986

Statement of:
Whitehead, John C., Deputy Secretary, Department of State 7
Abramowitz, Morton I., of Massachusetts, nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 15

APPENDIX

Prepared statement of:
Whitehead, John C 33
Abramowitz, Morton I 38
Insertions for the record:
Response of Acting Secretary Whitehead to a question asked by Senator Helms 39
Letter to Senator Helms from John C. Whitehead, dated March 31, 1986 ... 40

NOMINATION OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Trible, Evans, Pell, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. The committee is pleased to welcome today Morton I. Abramowitz, H. Allen Holmes, and Otto Reich, whose nominations we are considering this afternoon. Mr. Abramowitz and Mr. Holmes are serving as directors of their respective bureaus. Mr. Abramowitz has been Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for 14 months. Mr. Holmes has been Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs for 8 months.

In passing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act last year, Congress recognized the need to upgrade the leaders of these two important Bureaus of the State Department to the rank of Assistant Secretary. At this time of close attention to the budget, it should be noted the upgrades do not involve additional expenditures.

Mr. Abramowitz' nomination we will consider first. He has been nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary heading the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR represents the State Department, and the intelligence community, and analyzes intelligent data as well as public information for the policymakers at the State Department.

He has been with the State Department for 26 years, and has considerable experience in the Far East.

Mr. Holmes has been nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs. He joined the State Department in 1958. Before assuming his present position, he held a number of senior positions in the Bureau of European Affairs. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs has a number of responsibilities related to security assistance, military matters, and weapon exports.

Also before us today is Dr. Otto Reich, nominated to be Ambassador to Venezuela. Mr. Reich has been defending U.S. policies for 2 years as the State Department's coordinator for public diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean. I know that my distinguished colleague, Senator Jesse Helms, has asked to be present during the conduct of this hearing. He is presently with us, and I would like to turn to Senator Helms for opening comments he

might have or in fact questions, because he will be detained by other matters that are important to the country in a short while, and I would like to at this moment give him full opportunity.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, as always, you are most gracious, and I appreciate it.

And, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, I just have a couple of questions for Mr. Abramowitz. Do you, sir, think that the United States Government should take any steps which would have the effect of encouraging the Republic of China to negotiate its future with Communist China?

STATEMENT OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, that question is not in my responsibility. I am not a policy official of the U.S. Government. I am the senior intelligence officer in the Department of State. I do not get involved in making policy recommendations as part of the work of the State Department, and that is not a question that I am appropriately able to answer in my present incarnation.

Senator HELMS. Well, you have been nominated for Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, and the last time I checked, that would involve your playing a role, and perhaps a key role, in preparing decisions which could very well affect our relationship with Taiwan. And let me say to you, I am a pro-Taiwan man, and I want to know where everybody stands in the State Department and elsewhere in the Government.

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Let me say, I have prepared papers that relate to questions of that nature, but all those papers that have been prepared are not related to any policy judgment on my part or any policy inclination on my part. They relate to trying to bring out the relevant considerations that a policymaker may want to know about in considering what to do about that problem.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Abramowitz, I like you, and I do not want to have any dispute with you, but you have never operated in a vacuum wherever you have been. You have your input in terms of policy and you will in this job. Are you sure you do not want to respond to my question about how you feel?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Let me just say, Senator, as an—I think you have to distinguish between me as a person who is involved in foreign policy questions and me as the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

As Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in regard to papers that we produce, we try our best to keep them value-free that is free of policy recommendations. I would not deny to you that at times I discuss policy with a variety of officials, but that is purely informal. It has no standing. And I do not play a role in trying to generate policy through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I was under the impression that an Assistant Secretary by definition, operates on a policymaking level. Is that not correct?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, But this is not a policymaking job, Senator, with one exception, and that is, in regard to the coordination of sensitive intelligence activities of the U.S. Government of which I, working together with the relevant regional bureaus and under the direction of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs work in the coordination of those activities.

Senator HELMS. Now, I want to be entirely civil about this, and I just want to know if I understand you correctly. You are declining to answer my question?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. I am declining to answer your question because I am not a policy——

Senator HELMS. This question requires only a one word answer, yes or no.

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Yes; I am declining to answer your question. I am not a policy official of the U.S. Government. I do not speak for the U.S. Government on policy.

Senator HELMS. Well, all right.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Let me indicate at this point that perhaps the nominees have initial statements they would like to make this afternoon. If so, I would like to proceed in that way. Each one of you perhaps would like to make an initial comment, and then we will proceed to questions of the committee.

Mr. Abramowitz, do you have an initial statement?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. No; I do not have a statement, Senator, but if I may, I would make a few remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Mr. Chairman and Senators, this is the third time I have been here in this fashion, and I am pleased and honored to be back again. I have worked in the past in a variety of incarnations with members of the committee, and if confirmed, I obviously would be prepared to help the committee in any way I can.

This is an unusual hearing in that I have been in the job for 14 months. I hope I have developed some qualifications for the job. I am not a professional intelligence officer. That is, I did not spend my life in the intelligence community. I have spent the past 25 years, however, heavily engaged in various aspects that involve intelligence.

First, I have been an avid consumer of intelligence, and in a number of cases this intelligence has been very valuable to me as I have done a variety of jobs. Second, I have been a producer of large volumes of intelligence as a Foreign Service reporting officer and as its ambassador on a number of occasions.

In fact, if I can put in a plug for the State Department and the Foreign Service, I would say that the vast bulk of political economic information available to this Government comes from the Foreign Service of the United States and, indeed, one of the Secretary of State's principal concerns in the past 4 years he has been in the position has been to try to improve the State Department's analytical and reporting capabilities.

Finally, let me say something about INR. INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is a miniscule part of the intelligence commu-

nity, either budget or personnelwise. I think several directorates of the Central Intelligence Agency analytical functions are larger than INR.

Nevertheless, small is in some ways beautiful, and we play a very active role in all aspects of the community's analytical effort, and in efforts to determine priorities in the collection of intelligence. Within the State Department itself, as I tried to explain to Mr. Helms, we are not a policymaking bureau. Our purpose is principally to try to bring intelligence information and analysis to bear for the Secretary of State and its principal associates which we hope will illuminate the policymaking process.

INR lives solely by what it has to say. If it has something interesting to say that is useful to the policymaker, we will be appreciated. If we do not have anything to say that is of interest, we will not have fulfilled our purpose. Our Bureau is made up of essentially half of civil servants and half of Foreign Service officers. I have about 180 people doing analytical work. Some of them are stars.

Most of them are highly competent people with a record of proven analytical ability. I am pleased to head the agency. I will try to answer all of your questions. I may not be able to handle some of them in open session.

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Abramowitz follows:]

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

Position for which considered: Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

Present position: Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Office address: Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Born: January 20, 1933, Lakewood, New Jersey.

Legal residence: Massachusetts.

Maritime status: Married.

Family: Wife: Sheppie Glass; children, Michael, Rachel.

Home address: 1045 31st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007.

Education: 1953, B.A., Stanford University; 1955, M.A., Harvard University.

Language ability: Chinese.

Experience: Military, 1957: United States Army. Government, 1956–58: Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., Management Intern; 1958–59: International Cooperation Administration [ICA], Washington, D.C.; 1959–60: Overseas Intern, International Cooperation Administration; 1960: Joined Foreign Service; 1960–62: Cons/Econ Officer; 1962–63: Language Area Training (Taichung); 1963–66: Political Officer, Hong Kong; 1966–68: Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; 1968–69: Staff member of the Senior Inter-Department Group, Department of State; 1969–70: Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, Department of State; 1970–: Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Research Fellow; 1971–72: Office of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Director, East Asian Affairs, Department of State; 1972–73: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; 1973–74: CINCPAC Political Adviser, Honolulu; 1974–78: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-America, East Asia and Pacific; 1978–81: U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Bangkok; 1982–82: Rand Corp., Washington, D.C. (On detail from Department of State); 1983–84: U.S. Representative to MBFR Vienna; 1985–present: Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Awards: 1976: Distinguished Public Service Award, Department of Defense; 1978: Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Award; 1980: Joseph C. Wilson Award for Distinction in International Affairs; 1981: President's Award for Distinguished Federal Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Abramowitz, why does the Department of State need its own intelligence agency? Can you rationalize why the resources of the Government are not adequate to cover for State?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. Well, that is a good question, Senator, and I frankly ask myself that from time to time. I think I would basically say there are three reasons. The first is that there are two agencies which essentially do political and political-military analysis, and economic analysis. That is the CIA and the State Department. To a lesser extent this is done by the Defense Intelligence Agency. I think it is essential on all important business of Government on questions of national security that we not be limited to one view of the facts or how the facts work themselves out. I think it is essential to have competitive analysis. I am personally not a great believer in one centralized analytical system. I think that is courting a potential for disaster. That is my own personal view.

Second, and I cannot really document this, but I believe it firmly, I think there comes a synergism in terms of analysis, relevancy, cogency, which emerges when you combine Foreign Service officers who have worked on policy and are interested in policy and can see things from the perspective of the Secretary of State and the senior officials, and longtime people who are knowledgeable of the area, the history of the area, and have a sort of permanency, and I think the interaction between them produces a very relevant and cogent product which is not always produced in the CIA, and I am not making an invidious comparison against the CIA. They do enormously good things, things that INR could never dream of doing, particularly things in depth.

Finally, there are activities of the intelligence community which are very sensitive and are very relevant to foreign policy which must be looked at from a foreign policy perspective. Someone must coordinate these. Someone must bring out the foreign policy implications. We are the only element in the State Department which is permitted to handle that whole variety of things, and I think it is essential to have that in the State Department and not to leave it to the intelligence community which has its own perspective on problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you characterize INR as a full player in the intelligence community? Granted the premise that there ought to be these various sources that supplement each other, are you confident the point of view that comes from INR is well received by the others? And how would you describe——

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. I would not say it is always well received, but it is always available, and I think in terms of analysis, in terms of the analytical function, in terms of how to determine what our priorities in the collection of intelligence, and what are the things we should target, I think there is no question that we are a very active participant, much greater than the size of our small group of people.

In terms of the overall budget of the intelligence community, the major agencies in the intelligence community, or in the internal management of some of our major intelligence organizations, our role is minor. Occasionally we will make points or proposals on certain specific things which we feel have an important foreign policy relevance, but on that side of the business we would largely leave it to the internal workings of the agencies themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. To the best of my knowledge, our committee does not now receive products of the INR on a regular basis. Is there a

reason for that? And if there is no prohibition, is it possible that we could imbibe more heavily in your work?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. No; I see no reason why you cannot receive our products, at least those people who are appropriately cleared and are able to receive this information. I see no reason why a sizable number of our publications cannot be available to the committee if the committee is so interested.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate working with you on that. Let me ask, and this may be a question that you would want to reserve for a closed session, that the INR budget has had a substantial increase, at least a request from $2.9 million to $5.8 million requested for fiscal year 1987 primarily to pay for consultants.

Our best information is that you have 333 employees presently, which is a fair number. Can you rationalize the necessity for that kind of an increase as opposed to in-house capacity?

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. I think there is a little confusion, Senator. I am happy to answer that question here. I think there is a little confusion in the numbers. The increase over the past 3 years in the INR budget is not due to a request for external research funds. It is essentially due to an effort to modernize our communications and information handlings.

INR is, I have to tell you, in the 13th century in terms of trying to cope with the paper flow that inflicts the intelligence community. We hope to move into the 19th century. Maybe 10 years later we will move into the 20th century, but that is what it is for. It is not for external research. Our external research budget in the past 2 years has been about the same. We have asked for a relatively small increase this year, around $300,000, but the bulk of the increase which you are referring to does not refer to external research.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

While Senator Dodd is present, let me ask both for the record and as a matter of personal interest, do any of you have members of your families here today, and would you like to introduce them? Mr. Abramowitz.

Mr. ABRAMOWITZ. I have my wife, Sheppie, and my son, Michael. I think he is here.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have you today.

At this point we will proceed to markup on the nominations when we have a quorum of our committee at a business meeting. I have no further questions, and therefore the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m. the committee was adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday, April 29, 1986.]

NOMINATION OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Evans, Cranston, and Dodd.

Senator HELMS. The committee will come to order.

We welcome Secretary Whitehead and Secretary Abramowitz, but first I have a little piece of art work, a chart, that I will use here in a minute, just so that I can try to keep this straight in my own mind. [Indicating.]

I am trying to keep straight, shall we say, the bureaucracy at the State Department. Do not be alarmed about that. The chart is more for me than for anybody else, though.

I have no opening statement, and I would inquire of Senator Cranston, if you have anything to say.

Senator CRANSTON. No, I do not.

Senator HELMS. Senator Evans, do you have any statement you would care to make?

Senator EVANS. No, I have no opening statement.

Senator HELMS. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Very well, then. Let me start with a few questions for Secretary Whitehead. If you have a prepared statement, please submit it for the record.

[The prepared statement of Deputy Secretary Whitehead may be found in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. Last year, Mr. Secretary, the State Department Authorization Act increased the number of Assistant Secretaries of State by two, is that correct?

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. WHITEHEAD, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. And that raised the posts of Director of Intelligence and Research, and the Political and Military Affairs, to the level of Assistant Secretary. Those were the two, is that correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. These were elevated to the level of Assistant Secretary. I believe this was done at the initiative of the State Department, was it not?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, I think it was.

Senator HELMS. And Congress agreed to that. I also believe that the State Department now has 16 bureaus or 18, if you include Administration and Personnel; would that be correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, all of these are now presided over by an Assistant Secretary, a Level IV Presidential appointment, with two exceptions, the Bureau of Personnel and the Bureau of Refugee Programs.

The Bureau of Personnel and the Bureau of Refugee Programs still have Directors who are appointed by the Secretary, rather than by the President. I am right so far; is that correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, what is the reason that some Bureaus have Assistant Secretaries at their heads and others have Directors?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. It was originally felt that the most important bureaus should be headed by Assistant Secretaries and others by Directors. But as time has gone on more and more Bureaus have emerged as being more important than others and now, as you have pointed out, nearly all of the Bureaus have Assistant Secretaries at their heads.

Senator HELMS. OK. Now, these two fall into the category as having been determined to be more important, these two here, Intelligence and Research and Political Military Affairs?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. May I ask, what is the salary difference between an Assistant Secretary and a Director?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. I am not sure, sir. It would be very small.

Senator DODD. The salary, or the difference? [Laughter.]

Mr. WHITEHEAD. The difference would be very small. Both would be very small, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. Will Mr. Abramowitz' salary be increased with this change?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I do not believe so, sir.

Senator HELMS. It would remain the same?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe it will remain the same.

Senator HELMS. Will the nature of your duties change?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. Do you agree with that?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Was there a change in the size or scope of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. As a result of the change in title?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, what conclusions, if any, should we draw from the fact that an Assistant Secretary is a Presidential appointment now subject to Senate confirmation, whereas a Director, is appointed by the Secretary of State without senatorial advice and consent?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. The difference is that the new title of Assistant Secretary that will now be held by the head of the Bureau recognizes the increased importance of the Bureau in the overall affairs of the Department and in the affairs of the country.

It is an extremely important Bureau. It is larger in size than any of the regional Bureaus as far as the number of people and it has become extremely important in this complex period where intelligence and the analysis of intelligence are so crucial to the conduct of our foreign affairs.

This new status for the Bureau recognizes that what we believe is this increased importance——

Senator HELMS. All right. Just the same, when an appointment becomes subject to confirmation by the Senate, that is an acknowledgment on its face that the nominee is then subject to scrutiny by the political process and by political criteria rather than by internal, executive or management criteria. Is that not correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir. That certainly is true.

Senator HELMS. Is it not also an acknowledgment on its face that the post in question, the one to which Mr. Abramowitz has been nominated, is per se concerned with policy?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. This particular Bureau is not concerned with policy but only with the collection and analysis of intelligence. The Secretary of State has made it a firm requirement that this Bureau not be involved in policy because he wants to keep its work entirely objective.

He wants it just to learn of intelligence that we can obtain from our own sources and from other intelligence-gathering organizations in the Government, and to analyze that intelligence but not be involved in the policy setting decisions since if it does become involved in policy, it may slant its collection and analysis of intelligence toward our policy, and therefore lose its value to us as being a completely independent, completely dispassionate analyzer of the intelligence.

Senator HELMS. Yes, but Mr. Secretary, and I do not propose to be argumentative with you, you cannot pluck out one Presidential nominee and say, oh, well, we have decided at the State Department that he cannot be asked policy questions and he cannot answer.

Now, it just does not work that way, because we have a duty to ask and we have a right to have answers to the questions. This is why we are here this afternoon.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Sir, if I could amplify my answer so that you would clearly understand our position, I have explained why we keep this Bureau separate from the policymaking function in order to preserve its dispassionate collection and analysis of intelligence.

But having said that, we acknowledge that since the head of the Bureau is now coming up for an Assistant Secretary job which must be approved by the Senate, that the Senate, through this committee, has every right to ask him questions that bear on his qualifications of any sort including having to do with policy matters, provided the committee understands that in his job he is not involved in determining policy one way or another.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know, you can say he is not involved in policy but I do not believe by the stroke of a pen, or if you will forgive me, a declaration by you or by Secretary Shultz that you can make a political, philosophical, policywise eunuch out of him. Of course he is going to be involved in policy.

I mean, I respect you and I like you, but I do not see where you are coming from on that. Now, this President has assured this country, and he has assured me and other Senators who have visited with him at various times, that he is trying to reform policy, budgetary policy, foreign policy and all the rest of it, and to do that he has to consider past errors as he sees them to be, and we have the same obligation as Senators.

Now, I don't understand how it can be contended, first of all, that he will not be involved in policy at all, because I think he absolutely will, unless he is a philosophical eunuch, and that he is not.

There is a general principle of noncareer executive appointment that was well stated in the December 31, 1984, Senate report, "Policy and Supporting Positions" by name. Are you familiar with that report?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. This was released by Senator Roth's Committee on Governmental Affairs. The general principle I am about to quote applies not only to positions as high as Assistant Secretary, but even to "excepted" positions in GS–16 and GS–18 levels. Senator Roth's report said, that such appointments are made to nonmanagerial positions under the following conditions: If the incumbent will, one, be deeply involved in the advocacy of controversial administration programs; two, participate significantly in the determination of major political policies of the administration; or, three, serve as a principal assistant or advisor to a Presidential appointee or other key political figures.

Such positions are of a type which share with Presidential appointees the advocacy of current administration policies, and help assure control of the executive machinery of Government by the political party in power.

Now, are you saying to me that these three criteria are not appropriate to describe the duties of any and every assistant secretary as well, are you?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. No, I think they are appropriate for all Assistant Secretaries.

Senator HELMS. Now, as I understand it, there are about 8,000 domestic jobs in the State Department. Is that approximately correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, Senator Roth's report, or the report of his committee, lists 374 of these 8,000 that are subject to Presidential appointment. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if I might ask you to supply for the record an updated list of State Department positions subject to presidential appointment with an indication which of them are presently held by noncareer and which by career employees.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. I would be glad to furnish you with that information, Senator.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. Thank you, sir. Now, when Mr. Abramowitz, who is a very pleasant man, came before us in March, he stated, "I am not a policy official of the U.S. Government." Now, that might be true in his present status as Director of INR, but the position he

is seeking and the position to which he has now been nominated is not Director, as we have agreed, but as Assistant Secretary.

Do you really contend that an Assistant Secretary, by definition, should not stand ready to advocate controversial programs, to participate when asked, or when the occasion arises, whatever, within the State Department, to participate in policy decisions or to advise a key political figure such as the Secretary of State—are you saying that you do not propose Mr. Abramowitz to do any one of those things?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. That is correct, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Never to do any of them?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. That is right.

Senator HELMS. Well, suppose he does it?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. He would not be doing what his job calls for. Mr. Abramowitz, in earlier stages of his career, has been involved in policymaking posts and in future stages of his career I am sure he will again be involved in policymaking posts.

But in this particular job, as head of this particular Bureau, the Secretary has instructed him as he has instructed his predecessors to avoid getting involved in policy and to simply develop the facts of intelligence and the best analyses he can make of how those facts should be interpreted and to not slant them one way or another, to affect our policies.

That is the route by which the Secretary is assured that in making his decisions he has an absolutely straightforward source of intelligence.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know, I do not even believe I want anybody in intelligence who is not permitted to make judgments and to advocate. Now, I am talking about within the State Department, in the instance of this nominee.

Now, intelligence work requires a complicated series of assumptions, judgments, and estimates, and if this man is going to be proscribed from that, you had better leave him as Director. It seems to me that the last thing we want is a product that is—what is the bureaucratic term—"value free" because this President, any President, is entitled to have people who will participate in the advocacy of his policies. We cannot say to him or anybody else, "You cannot get involved. You cannot have an opinion. You cannot make a judgment. You cannot make an assumption."

All that seems to me to be an anomaly. I think what we really need is someone in charge of the intelligence product who can spot policy assumptions and point to the policy implications.

Now, really, do you disagree with me that that is why the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research should be someone steeped in policy who can participate in policy discussions at the political level? Are you going to sit there and say, "No, you cannot do it"?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. There is certainly nothing wrong with the incumbent in this job having a strong background in policy matters, but in the performance of this particular job it is important that he be dispassionate on the intelligence he receives and analyzes, or otherwise the danger, Senator, is that he becomes an advocate of a particular policy or an opposer of a particular policy, and gathers

and interprets intelligence in reference to our policy, and therefore the intelligence is not received in a dispassionate way.

It is just the way, if I were running a company as I used to do and had a research department, I would want my research department to give me the pure research, not to just tell me that a particular product was good just because our company sold it, but to really analyze the product in a completely dispassionate way to determine what the real facts were about this product.

Senator HELMS. Why don't you just buy a computer?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. In that way, I can rely on the research instead of the research effort becoming just a propaganda effort to justify or not justify a particular policy.

Senator HELMS. Well, I have a policy in my office. everybody understands it. I do not want any yes-men. I want them to advocate, and dissent and so forth, and they do. Sometimes I have to tell them, "When you are elected Senator you can do so and so."

I say this with all respect, sir, the position you are putting this man into is, he cannot do anything except hand you some data.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. That is what we want from him, Senator, absolutely straight facts on intelligence, and an analysis as to whether those facts appear to be correct facts, no coloration, no slanting of those facts, just the facts as they are.

We have lots of other heads of bureaus, lots of other people in the Department, who can give us policy advice, but this is the one job on which we can count to get the facts just as they are.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me quote you Mr. Abramowitz himself. He does not agree with you, at least from what he said.

He said:

> With respect to the special role of INR—

and if I am not quoting you correctly, Mr. Abramowitz, please call my hand—

> there comes a synergism in terms of analysis, relevancy, cogency, which emerges when you combine foreign service officers who have worked on policy and are interested in policy and can see things from the perspective of the Secretary of State and the senior officials on the one hand, and on the other with long-time people who are knowledgeable in the area, the history of the area, and have a sort of permanency.

I think that is precisely the point, the point that at the top you cannot separate policy considerations from the work of INR. Now, Mr. Abramowitz is human, and being so he has his opinions and it would be totally unnatural for him to say, "Well, I do not have any opinion on this, huh-uh, no, sir."

I say again that I think you are putting him in an untenable position.

I think it is not reasonable to expect that a nominee for Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research should not be examined on his personal policy views on key issues. The President has no mechanism to do that, except the State Department itself.

It is a duty of the Senate, as we agreed earlier, in considering nominees to examine them on their policy views past and present. You, yourself, said that he had had policy views.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. We have no objection to that, Senator. As far as our attitude is concerned, you are perfectly free to examine Mr. Abramowitz about his views.

Senator HELMS. But he says—he will say, I cannot make policy, and we will get to that a little later.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. That was his position at the earlier hearings, but as I indicated to you in my letter, we have reviewed that at the Department and our view has changed. Our view is now that you have a perfect right to ask for Mr. Abramowitz' views on any policies that you would like to ask him about, and he will answer those questions, just so long as you understand that in his current job it is not a policymaking job, but he will answer your questions about policy matters freely and I think he is prepared to do that today.

Senator HELMS. OK, I thank you, sir.

At this point, following up the statement that the distinguished Secretary just said, without objection I will make a part of the record his letter to me dated March 31.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Thank you, sir.

[The letter referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. All right. I will stop here for a while and yield to my distinguished friend from Washington.

Senator EVANS. I thank the distinguished chairman. Unfortunately, I will not be able to stay for the entire hearing, but I have been anxious to come and take part.

First, Secretary Whitehead, I presume that you are the direct representative of the Secretary of State who in turn is the direct representative of the President, and certainly in terms of policy personnel and other matters are attempting to faithfully execute as the President is called upon to do by the Constitution, to faithfully execute the policies of the President and try to carry those out.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. To the best of our ability, sir.

Senator EVANS. And in doing so, both you and the Secretary feel that this is the appropriate way to organize the Department to best carry out those policies of the President?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I guess I find some difficulty in pursuing the same concern that you have and I tried to reflect back this afternoon on my own experience as a chief executive officer. I think there are some rather striking parallels in what turned out to be one of the major policy initiatives that encompassed more of my time and more of the 12 years I spent as Governor than any other, and that was an attempt to institute tax reform in our State.

The key agency was the Department of Revenue, just as the key agency for our foreign policy is the Department of State. One of the top officials of that Department was the Director of Research. He was exceptionally valuable during that entire, intensely political set of determinations.

We went through the whole exercise twice, and we came out with somewhat different answers each time, but he consistently was called upon to do one thing and that was to provide us with the very best analytical base on which we could make policy.

Never once did we either call upon him or want him to try to initiate or to let us even know what his own personal views or his

policies might have been, because that, I think, would have seriously diminished the independent nature of his work which not only spread beyond the executive branch but made him an invaluable person to the legislature.

Because of the way he operated, which I think is precisely the same approach that is being suggested here—he was equally respected by the legislature as by the executive branch. We did not run into differences based on facts or based on intelligence that we might have otherwise if we thought he was guiding some of those facts toward a certain policy determination.

Senator HELMS. He was not confirmed by a legislature, was he?

Senator EVANS. He was not confirmed by the legislature, that is correct. But I do not know that that really represents a distinction.

I think that Secretary Whitehead has suggested that Mr. Abramowitz will answer questions on policy and they will be of interest, and perhaps could affect the votes of Senators choosing to vote on his confirmation, but it does not seem to me that that will necessarily transfer itself to the job for which he has been nominated.

Senator HELMS. Well, if the Senator will yield, that is the point in our being here today. The questions were not answered the first time around. Secretary Whitehead says, however, they will be this afternoon.

Senator EVANS. I understand all of that I appreciate that. But I also understand that the reason he did not answer the first time was on instructions from the Department, is that not correct?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator EVANS. I would just like to say that I wish I could stay for the entire hearing, Mr. Chairman, but it seems to me that in talking about the gathering of intelligence information, as an Assistant Secretary, Mr. Abramowitz would engage not only in the collection of facts but would evaluate the validity of those facts and that there would be some analysis based on those facts?

It goes far beyond, as the chairman suggests, just putting stuff into the computer and leaving it for someone else.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes, you are right, sir.

Senator EVANS. And therefore, I presume, his position is to be distinguished from other Assistant Secretary's. One is designed to make sure the facts are as useful as possible and as accurate as possible and the considerable judgment of the incumbent would be used to reach those determinations. But that is a considerably different thing than when, taking the best of the facts that you have and trying to create policies out of those. That is the division that you are trying to maintain, is it not?

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes.

Senator EVANS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I am sure the questions that will be asked, and the answers, will be effective. I have known the incumbent for some period of time and I know his record to be one of particular distinction for the United States.

I do not know how many people in both the Defense and State Departments have had distinguished public awards as frequently and at as high a level as Mr. Abramowitz. I think that is to his

great credit, and I believe he will continue to serve in this position with equal distinction.

I suspect that before his career is out, Mr. Abramowitz will be once again rewarded in the small ways that we reward those in public service, and that is by some recognition through a distinguished service award. Reward in the public service certainly does not come through money, nor does it come through a lot of other things.

Mr. Chairman, with that, I enthusiastically support this nomination and frankly, from my own experience, I believe that State Department has chosen a wise course in trying to make this a position that can dispassionately analyze facts and leave it to the policymakers from the Secretary on down to use those facts wisely.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. I thank the Senator.

All right, Mr. Abramowitz. Let us return to where we left off.

Do you think the United States Government should take any steps which would have the effect of encouraging the Republic of China—free China, that is, the Republic of China, to negotiate its future with Communist China?

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz may be found in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, OF MASSACHUSETTS, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, it has been the policy of this administration, and I believe of the previous administration, that the question of Taiwan is one for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to resolve.

The U.S. Government will not interfere in this process, will not be a mediator, and will not encourage the people on Taiwan or pressure them to engage in negotiations. Our interest, as the President has stated many times, is primarily to see that any settlement that should be reached be peaceful.

That is the policy of this Government. I believe it was also the policy of the previous administration, and I strongly support that policy.

Senator HELMS. So, the answer to my question is no, then?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Right.

Senator HELMS. I asked that question not because I am seeking an official policy statement of the U.S. Government. We are not here today to review U.S. policy in and of itself.

I want to know what you think personally, so the Senators will be able to evaluate how your personal thinking might affect U.S. policy. This hearing is about you, and it is respectfully directed in that fashion, not about official policy, what it has been, what it is now, and what it will be.

I just wanted to know how you feel in that regard. Did you ever participate in policymaking decisions with regard to Red China and Taiwan at any time during your career with the Government?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. In the period 1974 to 1978, I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs for East Asia. At that point I was involved in questions relating to Taiwan and to China.

At that time our relations with China were just beginning and so there really was not very much business in terms of defense relations with China, but it is during that period that I had some responsibility.

Senator HELMS. So, in 1962 and 1963—I am not hearing you fully but I think I understood what you said—in 1962 and 1963, at the beginning of your Foreign Service career, you were at the Chinese Language Training Institute at Taishung, is that the way you pronounce it?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct. I spent the years 1959 to 1963 living in Taiwan for 4 years.

Senator HELMS. So, it was 1959?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Then in 1963 you went to the U.S. Consul General's office in Hong Kong?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. You stayed there until 1966, was it?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. From 1963 to 1966 I was in the Consulate General in Hong Kong.

Senator HELMS. In 1968 you became a staff member of the Senior Interdepartment Group, SIG, of the Department of State. What kind of projects did you work on there?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. At that time the Senior Interdepartmental Group was a group chaired by the Under Secretary of State which was to review on an interdepartmental basis various policies and aspects of questions that had been delegated to them by the National Security Council.

I was on the staff for about 6 months and I worked by and large on a policy study on Korea.

Senator HELMS. A policy study on——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Korea. As I recollect, Senator, I did work also on a specialized study of certain defense requirements of Korea, particularly their defense against mining.

Senator HELMS. Then in 1969 and 1970 you were a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, is that right?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. Which Under Secretaryship was that, sir?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That was Elliott Richardson. That was from January 1969 to the summer of 1970.

Senator HELMS. Elliott Richardson. Then from 1971 to 1972 you were Deputy Director for East Asian Affairs for the Office of Intelligence and Research. Now, you were dealing with East Asian affairs during that period, were you not?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct, sir. But again, it was not on a policy basis. I was a member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Senator HELMS. Then in 1972 and 1973 you were Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as a CINCPAC political adviser in Honolulu, is that correct?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Right. I was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for a brief period, for about 6 months. It was also Mr. Richardson who moved over from what was then HEW to the

Defense Department, and following that job which lasted about 6 months, I went to the be political adviser to CINCPAC. I did that for 1 year.

Senator HELMS. Well, as a political adviser, your advice, I presume, touched on political affairs with regard to the Pacific Basin including Taiwan and Red China?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. From 1974 to 1978 you were Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-America, East Asia, and the Pacific. By virtue of this position you were—I do not think you will be modest about it, you were one of the Pentagon's top political advisers with regard to Asian affairs, would that not be fair to say?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. It is fair to say that I had the principal civilian responsibility in the Pentagon for Asian affairs. I had an Assistant Secretary who had worldwide responsibility and who was my direct boss, obviously, but in practical terms I was sort of the point man, from where recommendations usually began.

Senator HELMS. Then from 1978 to 1981 you were Ambassador to Thailand?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, Mr. Abramowitz, there are some who have suggested to me that our Bangkok Embassy has far more importance than one might normally think because it serves as sort of a listening post, does it not, a collection point for information from all over Southeast Asia? Would you agree with that?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe Bangkok is a useful listening point, yes.

Senator HELMS. Now, you have moved around a good deal in your foreign service career, from the State Department to the Pentagon to the Asian post. Is it correct to say that in almost every post, if not all of them, you were able to use your Asian expertise in the collection of data, in the analysis of policy alternatives, or actual policymaking with regard to Asia in general and China in particular; isn't that a fair statement?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, I think it varied according to the job. I mean, for example in Bangkok, obviously I would be very much interested in Chinese policies toward Vietnam and toward the Cambodian problem, but I was not working on China per se. I was interested in various aspects of China but China was not part of my responsibility.

I am just trying to be as precise as I can in answering your question.

Senator HELMS. Well, we will get into a little more detail on that in just a minute. Gee, you have served in a wide variety of posts in Government, and you were able to interact with other China experts or people perceived as China experts in this Government.

What methods did you use to coordinate with other Government officials working on Asian affairs?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. In which position, Senator?

Senator HELMS. In any and all of them.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. What methods did we use?

Senator HELMS. Yes, what methods did you use to coordinate with all of these other areas?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, obviously it would depend upon the question or the issue to be decided, but basically in all of the positions I have held I have tried to establish informal lines of communication with all the responsible officials in the Government, keeping abreast of what they were doing and them of what I was doing.

I have tried to keep abreast of all the intelligence that was done, particularly in the areas that I worked on, and I guess I did what a bureaucrat normally does, try to maximize the sources of information and to get to know the views of people around town.

Senator HELMS. Would you identify, to the best of your recollection, the groups with which you dealt in coordinating the work and the information and that sort of thing?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, I cannot give you a precise answer. It varied over time.

Senator HELMS. Well, identify three or four for me.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. It varied over time. For instance, in the Ford-Nixon administrations, when I was the Deputy at ISA, the principal people I was working with would have been Phil Habib, Ted Shackley of CIA, NSC staff, obviously people in the Joint Staff as well as in the DIA. Those are the people who basically at my level were working the issues which were facing the U.S. Government.

During the Carter administration there was a different set of a group of people that I worked with as a principal official. In that time it was people like Bill Graver over at the Agency, Dick Holbrook over at State, and again, people who occupied a variety of policy related positions that dealt with East Asia.

So, it is an effort in all the jobs that I have had, to try to get to know on an informal basis all the people who are involved in the problem. Am I answering your question? I am not sure I am being responsive to you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, I will tell you what I am going to suggest we do. Let us go on, and you think about it. We may come back to it here, or you may want to drop me a memorandum identifying the groups and so forth. But, I think it is important to have that.

What I am getting at, for example, in 1971 there were several major changes inaugurated by Dr. Kissinger with regard to China. Now, was there a China group, of whatever name, that discussed proposed changes and options?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. At that time I was working for Elliott Richardson as his Special Assistant. I do not remember any specific China group that was in existence. I believe that this was at the time we were beginning to make contact with China, and these matters were held very tightly both at the White House as well as the State Department. But, I do not remember any specific China group.

Senator HELMS. Here again, let me give you a chance to think about that. Maybe the best way to go at it is to call out some names and ask you if you met with them, either individually or in multiples of them. Whether you want to call it a group or not is up to you.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. May I also make one other point, if I may, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. China at that point was an exceedingly small part of my duties. I did not spend much time on China at that point. Please ask me your question, though, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, how about Peter Rodman? Did you ever meet with him, ever talk with him, work with him?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Not at that time. I only really got to know Peter Rodman subsequently, and particularly when I came back to the State Department to take my current job.

Senator HELMS. Did you ever discuss China policy with him?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Not to my——

Senator HELMS. You never——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, yes, but not in the period you are talking about.

Senator HELMS. Well, whatever period?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Oh, yes. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Winston Lord?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Winston Lord, yes, we came in the Foreign Service together.

Senator HELMS. Richard Solomon.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes, indeed.

Senator HELMS. Nicholas Platt.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Certainly.

Senator HELMS. Mike Armacost.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes indeed.

Senator HELMS. Where are these men today?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, Mr. Armacost is of course the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Platt is the Executive Secretary of the State Department, and Mr. Solomon has recently come onboard as Director of the Policy Planning staff. Mr. Rodman is over at the White House as the Deputy Director of the NSC. He was a former Director of the Policy Planning staff.

Who was the other one, sir?

Senator HELMS. You left out Winston Lord.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Winston Lord, of course, is our Ambassador to China.

Senator HELMS. As I mentioned, beginning in 1971, as I understand it, there were some major changes in China policy. That is when it all began. I think it was in April 1971 that we had the first intimations of "ping pong diplomacy," as it was called. Then the Republic of China was knocked out of the United Nations. I am talking about Taiwan.

We had the historic visit of President Nixon to Peking. Then we had the Shanghai Communique recognizing Peking. There was the theory there that there was one China, which I will never buy, and that Taiwan is only a province of China.

In 1971, under President Carter, this Government announced the recognition of Peking and the derecognition of Taiwan, the Republic of China. President Carter announced the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and froze on shipments to Taiwan.

Then, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, trying to remedy some of these mistakes, in my view. For the purposes of this hearing it does not matter what I think. I want to know what

you think. Looking back over these actions, do you think that this was good policy?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe, Senator, that it was necessary to move to improve relations with China, to reduce the hostility that had permeated our relations, to establish a friendly and enduring relationship with China.

Senator HELMS. Even if it meant kicking a strong, faithful ally in the teeth?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe that obviously there were difficult problems in the way of doing that. I believe very strongly in the security of the people in Taiwan. And while we had to do certain things which I think no one certainly liked to do, given the long relationship we had with Taiwan, I think those steps were essential to U.S. national security.

I believe Taiwan's security has not been endangered. We are committed to providing for the defense of Taiwan, the necessary defense capabilities. We have a very thriving relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan has grown enormously over the ensuing years.

Speaking personally, I spent 4 years there. I have a lot of friends there and I am interested in the personal security of those friends. I believe that the basic thrust of the policy of the United States Government since the Nixon administration, in trying to establish a satisfactory relationship with China, has been correct.

I do not say I agree with everything that has been done, but the basic thrust of the policy, I think has been a correct one.

Senator HELMS. So, there are some things that you would criticize or disagree with?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think probably there would be a few of those.

Senator HELMS. Did you disagree at the time?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. In fact, Senator, I was not involved in the question of derecognition, in the question of normalization which occurred in 1978 and 1979. I was out of town. I had gone to Thailand. I was not involved in the early stages when Dr. Kissinger was doing ping-pong diplomacy.

That came, frankly, as much of a surprise to me as it did to anyone else. I have, obviously, thought about this question on and off over the years, but you asked about my participation in policy deliberations in 1971, 1978, and 1979. They did not take place. I was not around.

Senator HELMS. So, how would you answer a question, if there were other Senators in here and one of them would say, "Did you participate to any degree in the formulation of the policy with regard to China?'

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Let me say, in the early period when Mr. Richardson was Under Secretary of State, I participated with him in efforts to end the isolation between the United States and China.

Senator HELMS. I am sorry. I did not hear you.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. To end the isolation between the United States and China on a few limited matters, particularly the ability of United States tourists to bring in goods from China, and the end of extraterritorial application of United States law to sub-

sidiaries of American firms abroad who were doing business with China.

That, basically, was my principal involvement, as I recollect. I may be wrong, but it is my recollection in 1970—from the period 1974 to 1978 when I was in the Pentagon, in terms of China the basic practical consideration that we really gave to China at that time from a Pentagon perspective was whether it was desirable to see if there were any ways with which we could build up our defense relations with China. Obviously China was a factor in defense planning.

In actual fact, when Mr. Brzezinski went to China in 1978, he asked me to accompany him. Throughout that period my principal practical involvement was Taiwan, and on questions of mostly arms supply to Taiwan.

Now, I recollect one other aspect, although I cannot be sure I remember all the details, and that was an effort, which had been decreed by the President to begin to reduce our presence on Taiwan, our military presence, and I was part of that exercise. Certainly we had discussions about the future of China and Taiwan and such matters as the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am not trying to interrupt you, and I hope you understand.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Sir, this happened long ago, and I am trying to be as responsive as I can.

Senator HELMS. I understand that. Let me say for the record that after we conclude here today, if you wish to go over the transcript and modify it in terms of later recollections, I want you to do that.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I appreciate that.

Senator HELMS. Because the last thing I want to do is to hold you to something where your memory or my memory would certainly be vague as to 12 or 15 years ago. So, I want you to feel completely at ease, but I do have a list of questions that I feel obliged to ask.

In 1971, I believe you wrote a book?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. "Remaking China Policy"?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. With Richard Moorsteen—I believe his middle name is Harris?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Richard H. Moorsteen.

Senator HELMS. Is it fair to say that this book was almost a prescription for policy?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, it was a prescription for policy, and it was written with that purpose. The State Department gave me some time off to participate in a book on China policy which Mr. Moorstein and I did, and we did make a prescription.

Senator HELMS. Well, not only that, as I read it I found it very interesting in that a lot of events that have occurred were proposed in your book.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think it is a very good book, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, I did not buy it. I got it out of the library. [Laughter.]

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. If you want a free copy, I will send you one. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. The book really was written to encourage the adoption of the prescription herein, is that not correct? That was kind of the purpose of it, was it not?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, this was at that time a review of what should be done, and as to whether people picked it up or not—you know, a lot of other people were writing different views.

Senator HELMS. Well, I was interested in the introduction or the foreword written by Mr. Fairbank. Professor Fairbank seemed to like the book. Had he read it before he wrote the foreword? I must confess that two or three times I have just scanned some galley proof and I did not read it all, and I wrote a foreword that did not say very much.

But, did he read the book and know what was in it when he wrote the——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I certainly think so. We gave him the book. He agreed——

Senator HELMS. You gave him the manuscript?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. We gave him the manuscript. Harvard Press gave it to him. He was an old professor of both me and Moorsteen. I certainly thought he read the book.

Senator HELMS. You knew him personally, then?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I have known him since I went to graduate school, yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, he said in that foreword, " 'Remaking China Policy' is a seminal study that sets into motion ideas that may outdistance even the author."

Now, how do you like that as a prophecy?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. He has a good prescience.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. He has a good view of the future.

Senator HELMS. You also have said, "The rejection of two Chinas and acceptance of Taiwan's autonomy under Peking's sovereignty, if it occurs, should not surprise us." That is a direct quote.

Would you be surprised if the United States ultimately accepts Taiwan's autonomy under Peking's sovereignty?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That, by the way, was not our position, Senator. That was Dr. Fairbank's interpolation. What we intimated is that there may develop a relationship, some sort of relationship, between China and the mainland at some distant point. We could not define what that relationship might be.

He himself wrote those words.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me just make a personal reference. I was around this place in the early 1950's. I had the privilege of serving two Senators as administrative assistant. The one with whom I came to Washington died in office, Willis Smith. He was succeeded by the former Governor of North Carolina, Mr. Alton A. Lennon who, by the way, still lives in Wilmington, NC, a great citizen.

During that time Senator Smith was a member of the Judiciary Committee and a member of the Internal Security Subcommittee. One of the most vivid recollections I have is the day that another scholar appeared before the Internal Security Subcommittee, by the name of Owen Lattimore.

Some of the statements of Mr. Lattimore were in contradiction to the facts. I remember his embarrassment when that was pointed out, but in any case in the 1940's, is it not true that Professor Fairbank, your friend, was widely known as an apologist for Chairman Mao and the Communist faction in China?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I do not know if that is a fair statement, Senator.

Senator HELMS. What would be a fair statement?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think a fair statement would be that Fairbank felt that the situation under the Nationalists had deteriorated enormously and that the ability of the Nationalist Government at that time to continue to rule China was very, very slim.

Now, it is also true that at that period, our knowledge of the Chinese Communists, what they were like, particularly the Maoist leadership, was not very great and I think there were some illusions, particularly at that point, about the nature of the Chinese Communist leadership.

Senator HELMS. Congressman Walter Judd had no problem about making up his mind.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Pardon me?

Senator HELMS. Congressman Judd had no problems about that.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am just saying, my recollection of Dr. Fairbank's perspective was more over his dismay at what was happening in the mainland at that time, rather than a paean of praise for the Chinese Communists.

Senator HELMS. In any case, what you are telling me is, you did not have any problem with the foreword being written by Dr. Fairbank?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think Dr. Fairbank is a very distinguished scholar. He is considered perhaps the dean of American China scholars. I do not necessarily agree with all of his views. I have had differences. I respect him as a man of great intellect and character.

Senator HELMS. So, the answer to that is, it did not bother you?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, let us look at some fairly interesting things in your book that I have underlined. The Library of Congress will probably charge me a dollar for marking up the book.

You proposed, in effect—and you did not state it this way, but this is what I got from it—that we really should not fight all that hard to keep Taiwan in the United Nations.

Is that a fair representation of what you said?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think that was based largely on what we felt was the futility of the effort and our ultimate—or what we thought was to be our ultimate interest in developing a more satisfactory relationship with China.

Senator HELMS. So, if you have the scales here, Red China and Taiwan [indicating] and then you put the weight on the Red China side——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Ideally, we would of course liked to have seen both Taiwan and China in the United Nations. But, we felt that was an impossibility, a practical impossibility.

Senator HELMS. Also, and I can find the page if you want me to, I gather that it was your feeling—and you may want to say, "Well,

probably I did at that time but I do not feel that way any more." Of course, that is up to you. But what I got from it was that the United States should convince Peking that we are serious about the Taiwan issue by adopting the one-China and Taiwan is its province policy.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. We took the position that it was somehow necessary, if we were to develop a satisfactory relations with China, that we make some gesture to China on the Taiwan issue. Now, the one gesture we thought we could make derived from the fact that Peking and Taipei both believed that Taiwan is part of China. That is the view on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

So, we thought we might generate Chinese interest, or give a signal to them on that score, as part of beginning effort to improve relations. We also sought to gain what we thought were important benefits on other scores, perhaps a reduction in Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese in the war. I think Dr. Kissinger's trip was a major contributor to the ultimate break between China and Vietnam.

Also, perhaps in our relations with the Soviets. But anyway, all that was the purpose of our proposal.

Senator HELMS. Maybe I am not making myself clear, and if I am not, I apologize. The thrust that I see is that you were contending, you and Dr. Moorsteen, that we really should not allow Taiwan to become militarily independent.

Now, did I misread it?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, I do not know, Senator. If that was what we said then I do not think we took a firm position on that. What we believed was that the American willingness and commitment to Taiwan would be the basic guarantor of that security, more than any provision of arms. We said almost nothing about arms to Taiwan except indicate that Taiwan might be able to develop its own self-defense capacity.

That was what we had written in 1970.

Senator HELMS. You know, the thing that mystifies me, here we are talking about an ally, a faithful ally, an anti-Communist ally, and you are putting a slightly different coloration on what you said than what I interpreted. And if you want to, I will look up the page and we will read it and discuss it, but I do not want to do that unless you desire that I do so.

Barry Goldwater submitted a statement this morning, he being as I am a strong supporter of Taiwan, and Barry believes absolutely that we have simply sold our good, reliable and faithful ally down the road. So do I.

You know, I have written a couple of books myself and every once in a while somebody pulls something out and says, "Gee, do you really believe that?' And thus far, most of the time I have said yes. Now, all I am asking is, in retrospect, if you were writing this book today, would you take that position?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Senator, I do not believe, in writing that book, that we were in any way selling out the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan. We were certainly giving them a political shot, if the things that we recommended to take place were to take place.

I have as much personal interest in the well-being of people on Taiwan as I think you do, Senator—I suspect I have as many friends on Taiwan as you do—and we thought we could make some improvement in, start a process of improvement of relations with China without doing in the people on Taiwan. That was our belief.

In 20 years I am sorry, in 16 years I think the people on Taiwan have continued to be very prosperous. They have a very dynamic economy, as we all know. They have made very impressive achievements and we have a major interest in them and a major involvement in them.

Senator HELMS. Well, just the same, all that you are saying being true for the present time, I do not know how often recently you have consulted your friends in Taiwan, but I have and they are living on a diet of fingernails. They do not know what to expect from the U.S. Government.

Of course, they have no option, no alternative to being as pleasant about it as possible, but in the book you clearly said, from my reading of it, that we should on a step-by-step basis move toward the abrogation of the mutual defense treaty. Did you not say that in the book?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe we foresaw that as a possibility, yes. We did not propose it.

Senator HELMS. As a matter of fact, you were in charge of the arms policy at the Pentagon, the arms policy for Taiwan in 1974 to 1978; I believe you said that earlier?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. That was the period leading up to the abrogation of the mutual defense treaty in—what was it, December 1978?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. Now, you left a couple of months, it is true, before the actual implementation of that, but that was the period in any case? Well, back to your book, and again, you correct me if my impression is wrong.

I gather that you and Mr. Moorsteen were saying we should always allow our policy toward Peking to be guided by the goal of convincing Taiwan that it is in their best interest, the Taiwanese best interest, to accept autonomy or some other arrangement under Peking's sovereignty. Did I read it wrong?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am sure you read very well, Senator. But that was not what we said.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me say for the record again that this was a while ago when this book was written, and I am by no means saying that what is written in this book would be the present policy recommendations if Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Shultz allow him to participate in the policy.

Now, there is one more remarkable thing about this book. The title says, "Remaking China Policy." There is not one word that I have found in it, not one allusion in it, that China, the People's Republic of China, is directed by a Communist regime. Not once did you use the word "Communist."

Was there any reason why you did not use that word, "Marxism" or "Communism," or give some little hint that here we are, dealing with the Communists?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, sir; there is no question that it was a Marxist-Communist government at that time. I do not see where any word we use has any relevance to our effort.

What we were trying to do was to deal with a practical policy problem.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is a practical problem, is it not?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Pardon me?

Senator HELMS. When you are dealing with or talking about a Communist country, that is a practical problem?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Of course. All I am saying is, I cannot read anything invidious that we somehow or other did not call it a Communist government. The name is the People's Republic of China. We called it the People's Republic of China.

Senator HELMS. Well, I would have hoped that I would have found in there some mention of the fact that the decisionmaking process in Red China is lodged, in fact, with the Communist Party.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Correct. It is.

Senator HELMS. But nowhere is it mentioned in there [indicating] and forgive me for going into this but I am trying to get inside your head and see, where is this guy coming from.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Senator, you are absolutely right. I do not argue with you about who controls policy in China. We wrote basically a very brief essay on trying to deal with some aspects of United States-Chinese relations, and its interrelationship with some other problems.

We were not writing a book on China, on its governing system. We were not writing a book on its history or sociology. We really wrote a very short essay on policy which was about 50 pages. That is basically what we did.

Senator HELMS Well, I ran for the Senate in 1972. Of course, Richard Nixon was President then, having been elected in 1968 for his first term. In my private sector job, before I lost my mind and ran for the Senate, I did some editorials. As a matter of fact, I did one every day for our company and for about 80 radio stations.

I remember being critical of the President for the Red China policy which Dr. Kissinger had promoted, Dr. Kissinger and others. I remember a campaign breakfast over in Salisbury, NC.

I got through with my little message and the man stood up at the far end of the long table and he said, "Aren't you the same fellow who is being critical of our President?" And I said, "Yup." He said, "You do not even agree with him about China." I said, "That's right." And he kept on. He was very persistent, pushing this thing that I disagreed with President Nixon on this and one or two other things that I recall.

And he said, "Well, why do you think I should support you when you have been critical of our President?" It got under my skin a little bit and I said, "Look here, if you are looking for a yes-man for the President of the United States, I am not your man." Whereupon, the man came around, stuck out his hand, and said, "That's exactly what I wanted to hear you say."

Now, I mention that because I want you and others to bear in mind what Ronald Reagan has told me over and over again, and I believe him, is his policy, his wish with respect to Taiwan.

Let me followup a moment. You propose the policy in your book which recommends a method of aligning ourselves with the aspirations of a Communist regime. Now, you did not identify it as a Communist regime. As you said, you did not mention communism, though I think you should have. But you did not ask me when you wrote the book.

This is essentially a book—and this is my view of the book—it is essentially a book on how to accommodate the Red Chinese. I guess what I am asking you is, did you purposely leave out any reference to communism in here, do you recall? Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Moorsteen?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. We had daily discussions and we focused on what we thought were the practical problems of U.S. policy. I look at that book, Senator, as a way of accommodating U.S. interests, and what the United States is interested in. That was our principal interest, how do we promote U.S. interests.

Now, the basis of that policy was actually followed by President Nixon in his Shanghai Communique. I have no responsibility for that. That was a decision made by the U.S. Government. But that book was written not for any desire to please Communists or the PRC, but to do what we thought was in the United States' interest.

Now, maybe we had a bad perspective on the United States interest. Maybe we did not perceive it well. But, that was the purpose of the book. We were not interested in promoting the People's Republic of China because it was the People's Republic of China. We were interested in promoting the United States, and where we thought it was important for the United States to go.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me phrase it another way, and you know I am not trying to be adversarial with you.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am not either.

Senator HELMS. What you are saying is that, despite the fact that it is a Communist government, we nevertheless advocate better relations. That is what I am saying. I am not saying you love Communist governments. But what I am saying is that this book tells me, by the omission of any reference to the pitfalls of dealing with Communist governments, certainly in terms of denigrating a non-Communist ally—as a matter of fact, in the summary of the book you said that the book proposes—I do not know whether you wrote the summary or Mr. Moorsteen, but you said, "This book proposes ways"—and I am quoting—"ways by which in very fine slices the United States and China can"—so forth and so on. It is a strategy.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Now, three of those steps which you laid out in 1971 in this book were, first, Chinese representation at the United Nations, government recognition, and equally important to the other two, the territorial integrity of China.

You said that we should move, quote, "ever so slightly toward Peking's preferred one China without ending our defense commitment to Taiwan."

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Correct.

Senator HELMS. Now, did you think it was good for the free world to accommodate Peking's preferred policy, or did you give

any thought to it or do you remember? If you do not remember, just say so.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No; we believed it was in our interest for a variety of reasons related to Southeast Asia, to the Sino-Soviet dispute, as well as related to reducing the possibility of another situation where we had fought one war with them on Korea and one war in which the Chinese were heavily involved, to make some changes in our China policy.

That was all that was involved in that basic thrust.

Senator HELMS. But there was a little more than that, Mr. Abramowitz. By using your own words, you know, "Oh, they are mine enemy and you are not mine enemy."

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am sorry, I cannot hear you, sir.

Senator HELMS. I said, you did more than you have just said, and I was quoting, "Oh, that mine enemy would write a book," and I said that you are not "mine enemy." I just wanted to find out where you were coming from.

You said, and I am quoting you, you said, "A position on Chinese representation at the United Nations that could allow us to acquiesce in Peking's admission,"—to the U.N.—"tacitly or overtly." Is this anything other than an acquiescence of the Communist policy at the expense of Taiwan? What other face can you put on it?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. There is no question that our—that moving Taiwan out of the United Nations was a blow to Taiwan. There is no question.

Senator HELMS. Getting Taiwan out of the United Nations?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. That is, the fact that Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations, was clearly a blow to Taiwan.

Senator HELMS. The road that you wanted, is that what you are saying?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Pardon me? As I said, we would have preferred, obviously, to at that point, 1971, to have both Taiwan and Peking in the United Nations. That, we saw, was a clear impossibility.

We believed that it was advisable from the United States. interest to allow Peking to take over the seat. In fact it was inevitable.

Senator HELMS. On our military commitment to Taiwan, you said in the book, "A more consequential problem is that a two-China policy would commit the United States or Japan indefinitely to providing a military shield for Taiwan. Such flexibility as we now have would be dissipated."

Pardon me, but those of us who are concerned about Taiwan are bound to wonder why the United States should have sought flexibility in terms of our loyalty to a faithful ally. You know, this is the bone of contention I have to this day.

I do not know whether you are saying what I have just quoted as an advocacy, or as a statement of fact or whatever, but it sure appeared as an advocacy to me.

In your book you said, "Peking's present strategy focuses on obtaining recognition as the sole Chinese Government and replacing the Government of the Republic of China in the United Nations," another instance on what appears to be an advocacy or policy, Mr. Whitehead.

You also wrote, "The direct commitment to the two-China policy would seriously aggravate"—and I am quoting—"our commitment to a two-China policy would seriously aggravate the relationship with Peking rather than improve that."

Then there is the question of honor, which comes up in my mind, and forever it will. I remember the absolute pledge of Richard Nixon in the 1960 Presidential campaign, which he lost, on that point.

You used such phrases as "the people on Taiwan" as a euphemism for "the citizens of the Republic of China." That was the same euphemism that turned up in 1979 in the State Department's draft of the Taiwan Relations Act. I guess that was intended to avoid offending the sensibilities of the Red Chinese. There is another passage, and I do not want to belabor the point. I have a whole string of them, which I am not going to get into or take the time for, but I am going without objection to ask that all of them be put into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

In 1971 you proposed, and I quote "a policy of one China, but not now." You said this "might be viewed in Peking as a small step toward its preferred direction." You characterized this step in the following way: "The essentials of this policy are simple enough: nominal recogniation of the territorial integrity of China including Taiwan, but no de facto reversion at present." That was 1971. I find it most interesting that this was the formula that was issued in the Shanghai Comminique of 1972. In other words, the formulation you proposed was actually adopted by the U.S. Government.

As far as our defense commitment to Taiwan, you wrote: "Given that our defense commitment to the Government of the Republic of China would initially remain valid, our answer could only be that future movement hinged on Peking's future conduct—both with respect to our other interests and in making reunification more acceptable to the people on Taiwan." There are three strange things about that passage. You say our defense commitment "would initially remain valid." That seems to imply that the goal of policy would be to remove the commitment. It seems that this is basically the route we followed when we announced the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979.

Second, you use the phrase "the people on Taiwan" which I discussed earlier.

Third, you talk about "making reunification more acceptable to the people on Taiwan." I can't envision any circumstances where people in a free and fair system with no outside threats or coercion would find it "acceptable" to come under a Communist government.

More explicitly, you wrote: "If Peking really tries to create suitable conditions for the people on Taiwan, and if the latter gradually realize that they too must accommodate, our military commitment to the Government of the Republic of China might no longer be necessary." It sounds to me like you're talking about pulling the rug out from under Taiwan, so that Taiwan would virtually have no choice but to seek accommodation with the Communists. When you say "no choice but to accommodate" it seems that you believe

that the goal of U.S. policy should be to force Taiwan to accept Communist rule.

In another passage you say: "The most important is that we want the future prospect of recovering Taiwan to continue as an incentive for Peking during a long enough time to establish stable, peaceful relations elsewhere in Asia." You are apparently arguing that Taiwan should be dangled before the Communist as a sacrificial offering.

You said the government of the Republic of China is already militarily strong; its existing forces could make an attack on Taiwan extremely costly. Given access to sources of military or equipment, it might soon be able to defend itself against all but nuclear attack if Taiwan becomes militarily self-sufficient.

You seem almost aghast at the possibility that Taiwan will be able to defend itself.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, Senator. I am not trying to be disrespectful, but I do not understand what you are getting at. I have given you what my views on U.S. policy were, what my views on our policy today are.

This book was written in 1970. The major thrust of it was to try to develop a more constructive relationship with China, and here is how it could be done. It involves certain risks and losses. Obviously, some of the things we said turned out wrong. I probably might write some of it again, but that is the thrust of that piece and it was not meant to denigrate in any way from any concern about the people on Taiwan, and I think that just is not the case.

You may disagree with what we recommended. A lot of people did. But nevertheless, that was the purpose of what we tried to do.

Senator HELMS. Well, you referred to the policy of the government. When you wrote this book this was not the policy of the government. This was the advocacy of a policy.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. You are perfectly correct in that. That was an advocacy paper. We were writing a policy paper. I had not anything to do with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I had been given off some time from the State Department to look at China policy and to give my perspective on China policy.

The State Department allows that to happen many times.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is precisely the point I have been trying to make.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. But what is that, sir?

Senator HELMS. That is precisely the point I have been trying to make. Now, John Whitehead is a fine guy and I am glad he is where he is and all the rest of it. But, we have had our first serious disagreement when he says that, "Mr. Abramowitz will never participate in policymaking."

That is a fairy tale. It is almost insulting to you, really. It would be to me. If they say they are going to make me an Assistant Secretary of State, but, "We are not going to let him have any input except to have him give us the raw data,"—you know, Mrs. Helms did not raise a smart son, I suppose, but she did not raise one all that dumb either, because I know you are going to have an effect on policy.

I guess what I am saying is, I had hoped that you would feel differently about some of the things that you had said, and maybe

you do. Just this morning we had a hearing and it went on for some time, on the proposed avionics sale to Red China.

I had to come down pretty hard on a couple of fellows I like, you know. I wish that things would just be fine all down the line and we could all be nice fellows and agree and so forth. But, I have a constitutional responsibility, as I see it, to raise questions and if they do not believe that Senators ought to ask questions, they ought to take it out of the Constitution.

In any case, Mr. Abramowitz, you have had a wide experience in our Government, and Senator Evans was very complimentary of you. You have been in many bureaus. You have been in the Defense Department as well as the State Department. And I guess the reason I went into what you said in the book is because I wanted to know if you really believe that the blueprint you outlined in "Remaking China Policy" and which has in fact been adopted by our Government, if you think it was a good one.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I'm sorry?

Senator HELMS. Do you think it was a good one?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, let me say that I believe what we recommended, in trying to establish a more normal relationship with China which was really the thrust of our piece—it is the only real operational significance, I believe personally, was the correct one.

It does not necessarily affect how I might feel about a variety of issues in regard to China over the years, but I basically believe it was necessary for the United States and China to improve its relations.

Senator HELMS. Well, did it deal with the honor and integrity of our country in its relationship with an ally?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, I know you feel very deeply about that, Senator, and I feel also deeply about questions of honor and integrity, and I think they are very important. They are very important, and we do not do things lightly.

I believe on balance that was the proper thing for the United States to do. That is my view.

Senator HELMS. Would that be expedient?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I believe it was in our national interest to do so.

Senator HELMS. You are familiar with what Ronald Reagan said when he was running for President, with respect to Taiwan? You remember that, do you not?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Which part?

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Which aspect of the President's—which part are you referring to?

Senator HELMS. Well, he repeatedly talked about Taiwan and its support for it. He referred to—I think it was at least two or three times, to wit, he went over there once or twice at the behest of President Nixon.

I just wonder what our allies, such as we still have, will conclude from the kind of policy that you advocated, and which has, in fact, become the policy of our Government. I just wonder if they will say, "Are we next?" That is my concern.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Senator, I guess we have somewhat of a difference, and I do not really want to unduly prolong this. I think they were difficult decisions. I think we have struck a balance between the security needs and interests of the United States and the security of the people on Taiwan which I assure you, I am as much interested in as you are. And, I believe we have struck a proper balance.

Now, you may not think so, and I respect that, but that is my view. I want to again assure you, however, because I know you are concerned, that I do have a great interest in the welfare of the people on Taiwan and it is more than just a policy or related interest. It is a personal interest.

Senator HELMS. Well, in your nonpolicy or policy activities in your new job, you will keep in mind our allies?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Absolutely. I always do.

Senator HELMS. Well, Mr. Whitehead, you were right. He answered the questions, and I appreciate both of you coming up. I know it was consuming of your time, but there are several Senators in addition to me who are interested in the answers and they will see them in the transcript.

I thank you very much.

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Thank you, sir.

Senator HELMS. There being no further business to come before the committee, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned at 4:07 p.m. subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. WHITEHEAD

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have been invited to meet with you today in support of Ambassador Abramowitz's nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. At his March 5 hearing, Mr. Abramowitz was reluctant to answer questions regarding his views on some aspects of U.S. foreign policy because of the nature of the position he currently occupies and the position for which he has been nominated.

We have had some correspondence on the matter. The reason for Mr. Abramowitz's reluctance was the Department's long-standing policy that the Bureau which he heads, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, should stick to the collection and analysis of intelligence and not get involved in recommending or defending our policies. I understand and agree with this policy. It helps to assure that we receive

intelligence information unbiased and untarnished by policy considerations. If intelligence information is shaded or colored to fit our existing policy, it loses its value except as a propaganda tool.

That said, however, it seems to me that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in determining the qualifications of a candidate, has the right to ask the candidate questions about any relevant subject, including the candidate's views on our foreign policy, if he has any. The fact that the nomination the Committee is considering today is not for a policy-making position, should not exempt the President's nominee from being questioned about policy matters.

Executive Order 12333, in establishing guidelines for the operation of the intelligence community, reaffirms the importance of providing policy makers with competitive analysis in the fields of foreign and national security policy. The Central Intelligence Agency, the DIA and the service intelligence arms in Defense and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, perform this task. INR also participates in the National Estimates process through which intelligence community assessments are produced. The National Estimates process provides a vehicle through which important analytic differences within the community are made explicit for the policy makers.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research plays an important role in the intelligence community. Its situation is analogous to that of the Defense Intelligence Agency. INR's focus is on the intelligence needs of the Secretary of State and his principal advisors just as the DIA's focus is on the intelligence needs of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs.

INR's role is to analyze events and trends abroad, based on intelligence from all sources but to avoid policy recommendations. I emphasize this point. The Secretary is very strong on it and has given Ambassador Abramowitz clear instructions to avoid any such recommendations. He wants INR to stick to its job, which is primarily to analyze events and trends overseas as dispassionately and judiciously as possible.

This work is, of course, extremely important. Long before the Secretary considered Ambassador Abramowitz for this position, the Department proposed legislation, which was approved in 1985, raising the Director of INR to the Assistant Secretary level. The Bureau's responsibilities in support of the policy process are as important to the Department as the policy responsibilities of the geographic and other functional bureaus. INR is in fact a larger bureau in terms of the size

of its staff than any of the policy bureaus in the Department. In addition, as an Assistant Secretary, the head of INR is subject to Senate confirmation which will enable the Senate to review the qualifications of the nominee to handle these important responsibilities.

Finally, let me say a few words about Ambassador Abramowitz, why the Secretary chose him to be Director of INR over a year ago and why the President nominated him to be Assistant Secretary.

Ambassador Abramowitz is a distinguished professional who -- in the best Foreign Service tradition -- has loyally and ably served various administrations in a number of sensitive posts. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense in the Ford and Carter Administrations and as U.S. Representative for almost two years to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna in the Reagan Administration. As Ambassador to Thailand he was the first senior American official to raise the alarm about the Cambodian exodus. Many Cambodians are alive today because of the efforts of Ambassador Abramowitz and his staff in Bangkok. In the past fifteen months under his direction INR has made important contributions to our understanding of events.

In choosing him to be nominated as Assistant Secretary, the Secretary picked a man of proven integrity and professional experience.

I believe Ambassador Abramowitz has brief opening remarks of his own, uniess you would like me to respond to questions on this or other issues first.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

I have only some brief comments.

In declining to answer a question asking for a personal polic view at my confirmation hearing on March 5, 1986, I want to assure the Committee that I meant no disrespect to the Committee or to any of its members. In a sense two principles were in conflict. I recognize the appropriateness and need for Senators on this Committee to determine a candidate's fitness for office and to ask him any relevant questions to ascertain that. On the other hand, I was not in the normal position of a new nominee for a confirmatory position. I had been in the designated position for 14 months and as head of the State Department's component of the Intelligence Community--the Bureau of Intelligence and Research--I am instructed to stay away from recommending and defending policy. I sincerely regret any confusion my stance before the Committee has caused. I am here again today to answer your questions to the best of my ability.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
WHITEHEAD - ABRAMOWITZ APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SFRC
April 29, 1986

Senator Helms: Could you provide the Committee with the number of appointees at the State Department requiring approval by the White House and the number of positions filled by career and non-career appointees?

Acting Secretary Whitehead: The Department of State has 374 positions which are filled subject to approval by the White House Office of Personnel. Of these positions 178 or 47 percent are filled by career appointees; the remaining 196 or 53 percent are held by non-career appointees.

United States Department of State

Deputy Secretary of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable
Jesse Helms,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510.

March 31, 1986

Dear Senator Helms:

I am writing in response to your letter of March 6 to the Secretary enclosing a copy of your letter to Senator Lugar on the confirmation hearing of Mr. Abramowitz. As you will remember, Mr. Abramowitz was reluctant to answer questions about his views on our foreign policy.

The reason for Mr. Abramowitz' reluctance was the Department's long-standing policy that the Bureau which he heads, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, should stick to the collection and analysis of intelligence and not get involved in recommending or defending our policies. I understand and agree with this policy. It helps to assure that we receive intelligence information unbiased and untarnished by policy considerations. If intelligence information is shaded or colored to fit our existing policy, it loses its value except as a propaganda tool.

That said, however, it seems to me that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in determining the qualifications of a candidate, has the right to ask the candidate questions about any relevant subject, including the candidate's views on our foreign policy, if he has any. The fact that the job is not a policy-making job, as is the case with Mr. Abramowtiz' job, should not exempt him from being questioned about policy matters.

Accordingly, Mr. Abramowitz is prepared to reappear before the Committee at any time and will be prepared to answer any relevant questions. As you suggest, I would be pleased to appear with him if you would like me to do so. In your questions I would only ask that you be sensitive to the fact that, unlike the usual confirmation proceeding, Mr. Abramowitz has been Director of the Bureau for the last fourteen months. I therefore ask that in your questions you recognize that and not undermine our desire to keep his Bureau's work apart from policy decisions.

Sincerely.

John C. Whitehead

○